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Finding the Truth
Louise Antony*

"Is Truth Dead?" asked Time magazine on March 23, 2017.1 No,
it is not.
People do care about the truth, at least in mundane contexts. If
the automaker says a particular car gets 45 mpg, and it doesn't, we
care. If the information board says that our flight is leaving from
Gate 24, and it's not, we care. If our children say that they have
done their homework, but they haven't, we care. Truth still matters. Why, then, do we elect people who don't seem to care about
the truth? I think that the answer to this question is partly political, and partly epistemological.
Let me start with the epistemological issues. The first thing I
want to call attention to is the difficulty of finding the truth on
many matters of current concern. I am a highly educated person
with lots of control over my daily schedule, and yet even I find it
extremely difficult to gain more than a passing understanding of
many of the important issues of our time. I certainly cannot personally confirm or disconfirm many of the propositions I believe to
be true, including some that form the bases of my political allegiances. These include:
my belief in human-caused climate change
0 my belief that public job programs will help the economy
more than tax reductions for the wealthy
my belief that the "free market" produces neither efficacy
nor efficiency in the delivery of health care.

* Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. I wish to thank Joseph Levine, Heidi Feldman, and Bruce Ledewitz for comments and questions that helped
me develop this paper. I would also like to thank Professor Feldman and Professor Ledewitz
for their kind invitation to speak at the "Will These Bones Rise?" conference. Finally, I would
like to thank my audience at Duquesne University School of Law for their stimulating questions and remarks.
1. Is Truth Dead?, TIME, Mar. 23, 2017.
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Why do I believe these things? Because I trust the experts who
research them, and the news agencies who report them. But this
just pushes the question back - why do I trust these experts, these
reporters? Why do I trust the people I trust?
Here it's tempting to say - as I have heard people in my milieu
say - that we trust the particular experts we trust because they are
"objective." And in what does this "objectivity" consist? I think
what people have in mind is that the trustworthy experts have the
following characteristics:
0

they consider all the facts; they are not selective

[
they base their conclusions on the facts, and not on their
own opinions or feelings
they consider both sides of a controversy, and respond rationally to objections or problems.
Taken together, these tenets constitute an epistemological ideal
that I like to call "Dragnet Objectivity." Older members of the audience will catch the reference here to a once-popular television police procedural featuring two LA cops. One of them, Sgt. Bill Friday, was a no-nonsense guy. He eschewed any premature theorizing. If any of his interviewees ventured to offer an opinion about
the circumstances of the crime or the identity of the criminal, Friday would cut them off curtly with his signature phrase, "Just the
Facts, Ma'am." Only after all the evidence was in, and only after
carefully considering it, would Friday reach a conclusion about the
crime.
Now no sensible person would expect ordinary mortals to live up
to the sterling example set by Sgt. Friday, but I do think that a
great many sensible people (including me in weak moments) believe
that we ought to try; that the more closely we can emulate Sgt. Friday's method, the better our researches will be. Dragnet Objectivity
represents an epistemological ideal.
This view gives rise to the corollary belief that epistemological
success is explained by adherence to the method of Sgt. Friday.
Thus, for those of us who believe in "science" (the scare quotes here
indicating only that it's problematic to think of science as a monolithic institution - a point I'll return to in a moment), it is because
science has been so spectacularly successful - the eradication of
smallpox, the lunar landing - pick your favorite example. And science, we think, has been successful precisely because its methods so
closely match Sgt. Friday's. (We don't think of it in those terms, of
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course!) Indeed, if you look at any grade school science textbook, 2
you'll find an explanation of the "scientific method" that is virtually
identical to the Dragnet procedure I outlined above.
Similar thinking is in play when we choose our experts. The New
York Times and National Public Radio, for those of us who rely on
those sources for much of our news, appear to many of us to closely
approximate the Dragnet ideal.
But Dragnet Objectivity, I contend, is not a suitable ideal for human inquiry. Firstly, it is nearly impossible for human beings to
implement, successful scientists and incisive reporters notwithstanding. But more importantly, secondly, it would be a disaster
for human inquiry if we were to implement it. According to this
conception of objectivity, individuals charged with finding or promulgating the truth must divest themselves of background beliefs
and stick to "just the facts." Since it is impossible for human knowers to follow this advice, the charge of "bias" can be credibly leveled
at almost anyone, including the scientists and reporters who compose the set of experts on whom most of us are forced to rely. This
is the route through which an organization like Fox News is able to
represent itself as "fair and balanced." 3 It is also the route through
which white power and other hate groups can claim to be redressing
discrimination.
The central epistemological problem that human beings have to
solve is the problem that Quine labeled "the underdetermination of
theory by evidence." 4 The problem is that (a) we always have only
a finite amount of evidence, and (b) for any finite amount of evidence, there are an infinite number of hypotheses logically consistent with that evidence. This means that (a) there is no such
thing, even for individual issues, as "all the facts" and (b) the facts
alone cannot determine any particular hypothesis to be better than
any other. Some other factor must come into the picture, if only to
cut down the set of alternatives to a manageable number. This
other factor, surprisingly, is bias. The explanation for our human
ability to know is that we come to every epistemic challenge
equipped with concepts and background beliefs that condition every
step of the process of inquiry - where we look for evidence, how we
2.

Or indeed, most any college study notes. See, e.g., Jose Wudka, What Is the "Scientific

Method"?, U.C. RIVERSIDE: PHYSICS (Sept. 24, 1998), http://physics.ucr.edul-wudka/Physics7/Notes www/node6.html.
3. Fox News had once used this phrase as its motto "Fair and Balanced," but abandoned
it in 2017. See Fox News Drops 'Fairand Balanced'Motto, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/business/medialfox-news-fair-and-balanced.html.
4. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL
RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 69, 83 (Columbia Univ. Press 1969).
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interpret evidence, which alternative hypotheses we consider, and
how we respond to challenges.
The underdetermination problem is present both at the level of
the individual knower, and at the level of societies of knowers, and
bias is present at both levels. At the level of the individual, native
biases enable us to learn important things that we would not otherwise be able to learn. The most dramatic example is language
acquisition. Children typically manage, within three or four years,
to acquire a very complicated system of symbolic communication,
without explicit instruction or correction. (In contrast, highly intelligent non-human animals, like gorillas and chimpanzees, can master some vocabulary but virtually no syntax even after years of assiduous instruction.) Noam Chomsky famously offered the explanation that human beings are born with an innate cognitive structure that is primed to build a grammar based on minimal exposure
to human speech.
More generally, it is clear that almost all animals operate with
what Quine called "an innate similarity space," native biases about
what kinds of similarities among the objects in our experience are
and are not important for understanding general features of our
world. 5 Some animals, like birds and insects, have innate algorithms or procedures that guide them in noticing and using certain
kinds of information.6 For example, indigo buntings, who migrate
up to 1,200 miles, are primed to attend to the fixed point in the rotating night sky - the North Star - and then to use that fixed point
to guide their migration due south.7 Similarly, human children are
primed to attend to speech sounds - they show a preference for
speech over other sorts of sounds at the earliest age at which contemporary methodology allows them to be tested.8
Bias, in these cases, plays a constructive role in the building of
human knowledge. But there is a downside: the same cognitive biases that enable us to quickly sort other animals into groups, so
that we can form useful generalizations about their characteristics
and their behavior, can also work to enable pernicious social biases.

5.

See QUINE, Natural Kinds, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra

note 4, at 114, 123.
6. Stephen T. Emlen, The Ontogenetic Development of Orientation Capabilities, in
ANIMAL ORIENTATION AND NAVIGATION 191, 191 (Sidney R. Galler, Klaus Schmidt-Koenig,
George J. Jacobs & Richard E. Belleville eds., 1972), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19720017424.pdf.

7.

Id.

8. Janet F. Werker & Judit Gervain, Speech Perception in Infancy: A Foundationfor
Language Acquisition, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 909,

909 (Philip David Zelazo ed., 2013).

Summer 2018

Finding the Truth

11

Sarah-Jane Leslie offers this sort of explanation for the development of certain kinds of social prejudice. 9 She argues, first, that we
human beings are prone to making generalizations on the basis of
just a few examples in cases where the salient property is "dangerous."1 0 So, she points out, we will agree that "ticks carry Lyme disease" even though it is only a tiny fraction of the tick population
that actually carries the bacterium." The utility of such a cognitive
mechanism is obvious: it enables us, or at least enough of us, to
avoid contracting Lyme Disease. But then, Leslie explains, if this
cognitive mechanism is set into motion in environments shaped by
social injustice, it can lead to such judgments as "black people are
criminals" (by a white person) or "Muslims are terrorists" (by an
American Christian). 12 The upshot, I want to argue, is that social
prejudices are not necessarily the result of stupidity or sloppy reasoning. They may be the result of a normal, generally useful cognitive mechanism being deployed in a "bad" environment.
Another important fact: beliefs acquired through the operation of
this cognitive generalization mechanism are resistant to counterexamples. Once I form the generic belief that ticks carry Lyme Disease, I will not give it up just because I have learned that there are
some ticks that are not carriers. Confronted with a counterexample, I will say something like, "well, in general, ticks carry Lyme
Disease." Leslie explains this in terms of a folk theory of essences.
If we have formed a generic belief about ticks, we have also adopted
the view that there is some property that all and only ticks have,
and that this property disposes ticks to carry the disease, even if
they do not currently carry it. This hypothesis explains the persistence of certain racist and sexist beliefs even in the face of myriad
counterexamples.
The kind of bias that I have been discussing operates sub-consciously. We do not realize that we are filtering evidence or failing
to consider alternative hypotheses in the cases I have described
above. But what happens when we consciously inquire? When we
explicitly consider our evidence and weigh alternatives? To consider that question, let us switch to our main topic - how to responsibly form judgments about complicated matters.

9. Sarah-Jane Leslie, The OriginalSin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization, 114 J. PHIL. 393, 394 (2017).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 397.
12. Id. at 399.

12

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 56

Start with science. Work beginning in the 1960's by Thomas
Kuhn and other historians of science, as well as naturalistic philosophers like W. v. 0. Quine and Hilary Putnam, showed that science
as actually practiced failed to conform to the ideal of the "objective"
scientific method. 13 Kuhn, in particular, challenged the idea that
scientific hypotheses were subject to constant experimental testing,
and that the hypotheses that failed were jettisoned. Rather, Kuhn
argued, successful science depends on the existence of a form of social organization - what Kuhn called a "paradigm" - that is based

on a set of broadly-shared background assumptions. These assumptions include a consensus about central tenets, an agreed-upon
methodology and a common understanding as to what questions
need investigating. The central tenets are, in practical terms, not
revisable. There will be no experimental findings that challenge
these tenets, because the tenets themselves structure the experiments - that is, the researcher's confidence that a certain experiment will yield useful information depends upon taking the background tenets to be true. If, however, enough "anomalous" observational results accumulate, and if some theorist comes up with an
alternative theoretical framework - and that is a crucial "if'- there
may be a "paradigm shift" - a wholesale migration of the scientific
community from one organizing theoretical picture to another. The
shift from Newtonian to relativistic physics is one example of a paradigm shift, and the shift from Linnaen to evolutionary biology was
another. Sometimes the shift is, as it were, grown from below, with
senior scientists clinging to the old paradigm while younger scientists bring in the new. (We see the same pattern in the introduction
of new technologies, don't we?) The shifts are not irrational- they
do occur largely because of empirical failures with the old paradigm,
and so are responsive to evidence - but they also occur because they
are available. Kuhn contends that the history of science demonstrates that old paradigms are not given up, despite accumulating
experimental failures, unless and until a new paradigm is proposed. 14
In short, science does not follow the "scientific method." In scientific domains, where a paradigm has emerged, scientists' commitment to background theory is a precondition for crafting useful ex-

13.

See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF UNIFIED SCIENCE (1962); W. V. Quine & J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (1978); Hilary
Putnam, Introduction, What Theories Are Not, and It Ain't Necessarily So, in MATHEMATICS,
MATTER AND METHOD: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1979).
14. See Kuhn, supra note 13.
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perimental programs. Moreover - this is very important - consideration of theories incompatible with the core tenets is ruled out.
Kuhn makes clear that, for example, progress in biology, dependent
as it currently is on the evolutionary paradigm, would be seriously
impeded if scientists had to stop and consider the hypotheses advanced by creationists. Contemporary biologists are justified, Kuhn
argues, in dismissing such hypotheses from the start. It is precisely
because biologists ignore such fundamental challenges that they
have been able to make the progress they have.
The lessons Quine and Kuhn gave us about science, apply to ordinary knowledge-seeking as well. If we want to understand our
complex world, we cannot behave like Sgt. Friday. We cannot garner all the pertinent facts - there are an unlimited number of those
- and so we have to be selective. Not only that, however - we cannot
even get facts in quite the sense Dragnet epistemology assumes. As
I admitted earlier, I have only the vaguest clue what experimental
evidence there is for human-caused climate change. I know what
the experts I rely on say is the evidence, but I have not read the
original papers by the original researchers, and if I tried to, I probably would not understand them. If a knowledgeable climatechange denier proffered counterevidence, I would not myself know
how to refute it. In this matter, as in many other matters, I rely on
testimony.
How does it work out for me - for us - this reliance on testimony?
Here again, we have a generally useful cognitive habit - believing
what people tell us - that works pretty well in a certain range of
circumstances. Most of us, I expect, have asked directions of a total
stranger, followed them, and arrived happily at our destination.
Most of us believe, with a native credulity, much of what our parents tell us, at least initially. (It is hard to imagine a serious measure of this, but I venture to say that, if we take into account mundane information like "that stove is hot," and "we call that a hippopotamus," parental testimony is more often true than not.) But as
we become more epistemically ambitious, we have to make explicit
choices - who to talk to and what to listen to. What we will rely on
as we make these choices is going to be guided, for better or for
worse, by our background theories.
Facts alone cannot guide us. It is impossible to assess the significance of facts - that is, the significance of truths per se - without
background theories. The reason is that empirical reasoning - reasoning that depends on propositions that are not self-evident, propositions for which we need evidence - such reasoning is non-monotonic. What that means is that adding a new truth to the truths

14
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you already have can reverse the valence of your conclusion. Consider: Breitbart News reported that 402,000 crimes were committed
by migrants in Germany in 2015.15 This figure suggests that altright opponents of liberal immigration policies are right to think
that such policies threaten domestic security. But now add the consideration that this figure includes the crime of "crossing the border
as an asylum seeker." Taking out those crimes leaves Germany's
crime rate roughly the same as in other years.16
Now when I first heard the Breitbart report, I had two reactions:
the first was, "well, that is just Breitbart - they're unreliable." The
second was, "I bet that's a lie." Both of these reactions were driven
by my background theory, according to which (1) Breitbart has a
political agenda and will lie if necessary in order to promote it, and
(2) immigrants are generally law-abiding people who actually contribute positively to the economies and social wellbeing of the countries where they settle. The interesting surprise, then, for me, was
hearing the Breitbart claim corroborated by Damien McGuinness,
a BBC correspondent who has been reporting from Berlin for 14
years.1 7 (The BBC is one of my trusted sources.) But then I was
counter-surprised to hear that - as I tacitly hoped would be the case
- there was context that changed the significance of the factoid.
Breitbart had not reported that.
But a defender of Dragnet objectivity should not take comfort in
this incident. My background distrust of Breitbart, and my nearreflexive trust of the BBC (and of This American Life from Public
Radio International) are not based on my own careful comparison
of the respective reliabilities of these news sources. (And how would
I assess reliability, anyway? I would have to use the very sources I
am evaluating to find out what the "facts" are.) My pattern of attitudes has much more to do with the coherence of the products of
these sources than with my background theory of the world. And
the project of justifying one's background theory of the world to
someone with a different background theory is huge. ("Spin" is bad,
and something that one's opponents do; "contextualize" is good, and
is what is practiced by my fellow travelers.)

15. Raheem Kassam & Chris Tomlinson, Report: Migrants Committing Disproportionately High Crime in Germany While Media and Govt Focus on 'FarRight' Though Crimes,
BREITBART (May 23, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/05/23/germany-registerssurge-crimes-right-wing-radicals/.
16. This American Life: Fearand Loathing in Homer and Rockville, THIS AMERICAN LIFE
(July 21, 2017), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/621/transcript
(quoting Damien Mcguinness).
17. Id.
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This is why I cringe when I hear friends bemoan the "stupidity"
and "ignorance" of the masses. I do not believe that everyone who
relies on Fox News is intellectually challenged. Nor do I believe
that all of my fellow progressives are paradigms of epistemic responsibility. We cannot separate reliable news sources from unreliable ones on the basis of formal criteria. People who get their news
from Fox do, it is true, operate within an "echo chamber." But, it
turns out, so do I. A multitude of studies indicate that people in
general rely on news sources that reflect their own political perspective, a trend that has been exacerbated by the internet and the rise
of social media.1 8 (Which blogs do you read? I read Truthout, Feminist Philosophers, Democracy Now!, and The Intercept.)19 Moreover, numerous studies in social psychology indicate that breaking
out of one's bubble is unlikely to make any difference. Mere exposure to disconfirming evidence has been shown, in several domains,
to increase people's confidence in their original opinions. 20
What is to be done? To some extent, my advice here is negative.
We must not exhort people to "check the facts" 21 to "be more critical," to "find out what the other side has to say." 2 2 Individualistic
strategies like this are not going to work, at least not in a widespread or general way. As is true for scientists, a citizen aiming to
be well-informed will do less well if he or she tries to follow this
advice daily. (Even triangulating among a variety of left-wing news
sources on just one issue takes my husband - who has a particular
interest in Palestinian rights - a couple of hours each day.) What
is needed, IMHO, is broad social support for institutions and social
structures that enable concerned citizens to form good background
theories.
18.

For a survey of the data, with special focus on the impact of social media, see Cass

Sunstein, #Republic:A Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (2017); Eli Pariser, The
Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is ChangingWhat We Read and How We Think
(Penguin ed., 2014). For an analysis of coverage of the 2016 election by liberal media, see

Nate Silver, There Really Was a Liberal Media Bubble, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/there-really-was-a-liberal-media-bubble/.
19. TRUTHOUT (April 15, 2018), http://www.truth-out.org/; FEMINIST PHILOSOPHERS

(April 15, 2018), https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/; DEMOCRACY Now! (April 15.
2018), https://www.democracynow.org/; THE INTERCEPT (April 15, 2018), https://theintercept.com/.
20. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979).
21. I check my facts at www.politifact.com.
22. See, e.g., Thorin Klosowski, How to Spot Truth in the Sea of Lies, Rumors, and Myths
on the Internet, LIFEHACKER (Oct. 11, 2012), https://1ifehacker.com/5950871/how-to-spottruth-in-the-sea-of-lies-rumors-and-myths-on-the-internet; Dan Rockmore, A Crisisfor Critical Thinking, HUFFPOST (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-rockmore/a-

crisis-for-critical-thi b 13329298.html.
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That brings me to the political problem. Remember the epistemological problem? That finding the truth is hard? That is also the
political problem. Finding the truth takes time, a lot of time. As I
said earlier, I occupy a position of extreme privilege in this regard.
As Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers point out in their 1983 book On
Democracy23 (still timely), because of the time and effort demands
of most jobs in the U.S., time for reading and thinking is in especially short supply for anyone outside the educated elite. 2 4 Moreover, educational opportunity - the kinds of experiences that give
people the knowledge and cognitive skills to educate themselves
about complex issues - is declining rapidly and alarmingly.
But then, too, we must factor in the consideration that becoming
an informed citizen is less and less valuable to people at median
incomes and below. Political discourse - especially at the national
level - has become largely irrelevant to the real-life issues that face
large numbers of people in our society. People are cynical about
politicians, and with good reason. Senatorial and presidential campaigns have turned into reality-show competitions, with candidates
who spout substance-free banalities, disciplined only by market research about which wording best "sells." 2 5 The real platforms and

promises are the ones candidates negotiate in camera, in consultation with their donors. Polling suggests that most people are aware
of, and unhappy about the role that big money plays in our political
system. 2 6 The resulting cynicism, I suggest, makes it all too easy
for voters to make their decisions based on nebulous criteria like
"leadership" or "strength." The vapidity of most campaigns also
helps explain the appeal of Donald Trump, who was perceived as

23. Joel Rogers & Joshua Cohen, Structure, in ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 51-62 (Penguin ed. 1983).
24. "Leisure time" must be understood not simply as time not working, but as time not
working that an individual can control and utilize. Hourly wage-earners and unemployed
persons spend more time not working than salaried and professional workers, but have less
money, security, and cultural capital to make use of it. See KENNETH ROBERTS, LEISURE IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2006); see, e.g., Brendan Saloner, Leisure Inequality: What Do the
Poor and the Non-Poor Do for Fun?, INEQUALITIESBLOG (July 7, 2011), https://inequalitiesblog.wordpress.com/2011/07/07/leisure-inequality-%E2%80%93-what-do-the-poor-and-

non-poor-do-for-fun/ (last visited April 17, 2018).
25. See David Flasterstein, Focus Groups: Manipulation and Representation, WASH. U.
POL. REV. (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.wupr.org/2016/01/17/focus-groups-manipulation-andrepresentation/.
26. See Dylan Scott, House Republican: My Donors Told Me to Pass the Tax Bill "OrDon't

Ever

Call Me

Again",

VOX

(Nov.

7,

2017),

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-poli-

tics/2017/11/7/16618038/house-republicans-tax-bill-donors-chris-collins
(demonstrating the
role that not-so-behind-the-scene machinations played in powering the recent tax reform bill
in Congress).
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someone who spoke plainly and sincerely, making him look very different from mainstream candidates whose every word had been focus-group tested.2 7
My background theory explains the degradation of political discourse in terms of a conspiracy theory. I believe that the United
States government currently serves the interests of an economic
elite: the Republicans a very narrow one, and the Democrats a
somewhat broader one. (I am a member of the second elite - an
academic, someone who, in effect, traded-off a certain amount of income for autonomy and the pleasure of making a living doing something I love.) According to this background theory, Democrats and
Republicans alike have an interest in obscuring the political goals
they actually have. So, Republicans claim to be helping the little
guy by "getting government off your back," and Democrats promise
to foster economic prosperity by increasing social justice. But in
fact, Democrats, most of them, are beholden to big money to the
same extent Republicans are - it is just different big money. Democrats answer to the pharmaceutical industry and the health insurance industry, and the financial sector, which is a big reason we
have never seen a proposal for single-payer universal healthcare
from a mainstream Democrat. (Bernie, of course, is not a mainstream Democrat. And I hold out hope for Elizabeth Warren!)
Thus, I share background assumptions with many Trump voters
we both think that the government is out to get us, we just think
that it's for different reasons. I think the government has been hijacked by the ultra-wealthy. The Trump voters think it has been
hijacked by people like me.
In any case, my main point is that it is difficult for any individual
to make any material difference with respect to large issues that
affect his or her life. Members of the 1% have the financial resources to hire managers and lobbyists - and some lawyers, too, I
suppose - to watch over and work for their interests. Members of
the - I guess it is about 5% - have the leisure, education, and connections, and may well have the energy to join and work with direct
action groups - Citizens' Climate Lobby, Jewish Voice for Peace, the
American Civil Liberties Union are some of the organizations to
which I contribute time and money. These organizations and others
like them magnify the effects of individual effort, making largescale change at least conceivable.
27. See Bernie Sanders on Abortion, ON THE ISSUES (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.ontheissues.org/senate/berniesanders.htm (noting Bernie Sanders presented the same appearance,
although in Sanders's case, there is plenty of evidence from his voting record that his campaign statements were sincere).
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There are some opportunities for collective action for people in
the 95%. Religious institutions are one example, and indeed, a
great deal of social justice and anti-war work is accomplished
through churches, synagogues, and mosques. But one important
organ of collective action - labor unions - is in deep decline. Even
the unions that have persisted in the face of economic reorganization and anti-labor laws - notably public-sector and service unions
- are facing a mortal challenge in the form of a court case - Janus

v. AFSCME Council 31 - which will be soon be heard by a Republi-

)

can-majority Supreme Court, which is almost certainly going to rule
against the "agency fee" charged by unions to bargaining unit members who do not join the union, but benefit from its collective bargaining. 28
Unions are one way to address the "high-cost/low-payoff' reality
of knowledge-gathering in the U.S. today. In their role as custodians of their members' interests, they can perform some of the informational watchdogging needed to track the likely effects of employer and government actions. They can also increase the likely
payoff of being well-informed, because, as collectives, they have the
resources to fight for real benefits for their members. I say all this
recognizing that this is an idealized picture of union activity. But
it is still the case that the period of greatest economic equality in
the United States, as well as the period of greatest economic
growth, was a time when about a third of American workers were
unionized. Now, nationwide, it is less than 10%.29 (Massachusetts
has one of the highest rates of unionization among teachers in the
U.S., and also the best schools as measured by standardized tests. 30

28. Teachers are one of the largest groups of workers who are still highly unionized.
There are now springing up many pseudo-unions hoping to drain genuine teachers' unions of
members once the agency fee is eliminated by the Janus decision. The umbrella organization
for these is the Association of American Educators (https://www.aaeteachers.org/) which offers "a modern approach to teacher representation.. .without a partisan agenda." And also
without bargaining power or job protection. See, e.g., Who Are We, ASS'N AM. EDUCATORS,
https://www.aaeteachers.org/ (last visited May 12, 2018).
29. See Union Members Summary, ECON. NEWS RELEASE (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
30. See Richie Bernardo, 2017's States with the Best & Worst School Systems,
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31,

2017),

https://wallethub.com/edu/states-with-the-best-

schools/5335/#main-findings; Amber M. Winkler, Janie Scull & Dara Zeehandelaar, How
Strong Are U.S. Teacher Unions?, EDExCELLENCE (Oct. 2012), http://www.edexcellenceme-
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The demise of unions (and the rise of the "gig economy") has resulted in the atomization of knowledge for a large segment of the
U.S. population.
In short - the problem of an uninformed citizenry does not, in my
view, reflect either a disregard for truth, or a general decline in intelligence. It reflects the fact that too few of us in this country enjoy
what philosopher John Rawls called the "fair value of liberty." 31 Too
few of us have the resources and time to learn what the truth is,
and too few of us can make any material use of the information once
we have it. To support the truth, I contend, we must support the
public institutions that support intelligence and erudition, beginning with public education. State support for public higher-education has declined precipitously over the last few decades, forcing
state universities to charge higher and higher tuition and to strike
more and more deals with corporate America. 32 The movement for
"school choice," where it has not been beaten back by concerned citizens (many of whom are members of unions), is decimating public
K-12 schools. If we cannot offer all citizens quality education, ideological "fake news" will rush in to fill the gap. Together with public
education, though, we must ensure that all citizens have access to
collective action, so that they may join their individual efforts with
those of others, to make genuine improvements in their own lives.
Do you want the truth? Then we must have justice.

31. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999); Leif
Wenar, John Rawls, STANFORD: PLATO, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/ (last up-

dated Jan. 9, 2017).
32. See Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman & Kathleen Masterson, FundingDown, Tuition Up: State Cuts to Higher Education Threaten Quality and Affordability at Public Colleges, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-

tax/funding-down-tuition-up (last updated Aug. 15, 2016).

